What is it to be rational? An individual appears to be rational, rational being his actions. But what does it mean to act in a rational way? Let us turn to the notion of rationality as a characteristic of human activity and those phenomena the notion in question describes.
The wide-ranging understanding of rationality may cause a danger of inaccurate conveyance of a chosen meaning in various contexts and thus calls for being fixed in a definite meaning. To choose the basis for the definition of the kind is of no problem. The names of notions bearing, as a rule, no indication of being associated with this or that meaning, what arguments should be offered in defence of such a choice? There are two main ways to choose the basis for a definition.
The first one is to turn to language, to the established tradition of using notions in various contexts. The main danger on the way is that the conservation of an initial meaning may put an end to unconventional trends of uncommon interpretations of the notion used, narrowing thus the sphere of its creative usage. Any notion depends on context, on the system of its consideration. That is why although philosophical categories have definite meanings they are mostly relative and liable to change their content even within the scope of one and the same philosophical tradition, allowing for historical tradition, context and aspect of the problem.
This is the situation as far as the notion of rationality is concerned. In the XX-th century the problem of rationality has become one of the central problems of philosophical investigations. The second way is to turn to reality, to those phenomena for which there are no generally recognised terms, so that it is up to researcher to choose any name to denote them.
Thus, an astronomer discovering a new comet is justified in calling it any name, however extravagant it may sound. But in a scientific investigation such a freedom is to a great extent restricted by the fact that a word of an actual language entails a train of meanings likely to distort considerably the understanding of those phenomena to denote which is used.
That is why the second way necessarily involves the elements of the first one to provide the happiest notation for a given phenomenon. Hence, let us define rationality as reasonably based normativity which guarantees an expedient process of activity. A man is rational in his actions if they are performed in accordance with some sensible reasons which make the aim he pursues possible of attainment.
Let us clarify our meaning. Any activity possesses a universal structure: aim — means — result. Being an ideal image of a final result, a reverberation of demands objectively existent, aim as an element of activity characterises its predictable result in the consciousness of an individual.
It is a fundamental element of its structure, a mode of constructing activity, an integral principle of reducing various actions to a system which possesses a quality of an absolute value within the universal structure of activity and has an outward valuative basing, that is a valuative basing of activity itself.
Means of activity in the broadest sense of the word include the whole complex of conditions, acts and things, methods and ways which make the attainment of the aim, its predictable result possible. Thus, result as an element of activity appears to be an incarnation of its ideal image and project. According to the definition, human activity is expedient and since the phenomenon of rationality pertains exclusively to the sphere of human activity, hence everything rational is expedient.
Expediency means an absolute submission of all the elements of activity to its aim, such a set of elements which necessarily result in the attainment of the aim. Let us turn to one of the aspects of rationality, i. There are two principal types of norms in cultural reality. The first type is a traditional norm which has spontaneously arisen in the process of social development which, as a rule, is anonymous and handed down by means of customs, imitation and so on.
This type includes customs and informal norms of different groups. But side by side with such norms there are some other norms which have arisen as a result of reasonable activity of consciousness or traditional norms critically reflected by reason. Norms of this type do not appear spontaneously and have an author.
These norms are textually formed and based on certain logical argumentation. To this class we also include norms of moral and etiquette, although these norms possess traditional character in greater degree than legal or technological norms and have neither unambiguous and strict wording nor unit codificational origin.
We assume that such norms, socially reflected, textually expressed and based on logical argumentation underlie a rational activity of people.
Hence, not every kind of normatively regulated activity may be characterised as rational one. So a theoretic model of rationality is a model of human behaviour and thinking, human activity on the whole, realised in accordance with norms which find their substantiation in the procedure of analytical activity of human reason.
Audi is a leading epistemologist, and epistemological issues get more attention here than in Nozick Nozick, Robert. The Nature of Rationality. Taking the capacity for rationality to be what demarcates humans, Nozick attempts a unified account of the phenomenon.
The discussion brings together issues and theories from across philosophical subject areas, including epistemology theory of knowledge , decision theory, ethics, philosophy of biology, and more.
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login.
Oxford Bibliographies Online is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. For more information or to contact an Oxford Sales Representative click here. Not a member? Sign up for My OBO. Already a member? Publications Pages Publications Pages. One sufficient means is to fly there; another sufficient means is to take free passage on a merchant ship. But flying costs more than I would earn there. Presumably, I ought not fly. It may be said that I have some reason to fly, but that it is outweighed.
This is an argument against Ought Sufficiency. However, with other kinds of costs, or objectionable features, it may sound wrong to say even that one has reason for the means. Suppose I have reason to alleviate pangs of hunger. One sufficient means to this is eating a sandwich; another sufficient means is killing myself Broome b. Some will resist the conclusion that I have any reason at all to kill myself.
Or suppose I have reason to improve college policy. But a necessary means to this is to kill the old don who resists any change because unanimous approval is required. Some will resist the conclusion that I have any reason at all to kill the don. However, it may not be an argument against Ought Necessity. It may be said that the fact that improving policy requires killing the don is itself a strong reason against improving policy, in light of which it is not true that one ought to improve it.
In that case, Ought Necessity does not imply that one ought to kill the don, which seems intuitive. In any event, the force of the intuition on which the argument rests may be resisted. Granted, it sounds odd to say that one has reason to kill oneself. But this may have a pragmatic explanation. Why bother to identify any reason to kill oneself when it is vastly outweighed by the reasons against doing so? Raz a; Schroeder a, Second, problems arise from repeated applications of transmission principles.
For one thing, means to means to an end may actually undermine the end. A necessary means to that end is baking a loaf of bread. Plausibly, he has reason to bake a loaf of bread. A sufficient means to that means is baking a giant loaf, which uses all of the flour.
But that would prevent him from baking a cake, and so prevent him from achieving the end. So, presumably, he does not have reason to bake a giant loaf, even though it is a means to something that he has reason to do. For another thing, if we accept both Weak Reasons Necessity and Weak Reasons Sufficiency, then repeated applications of these principles may imply that if there is reason for something, then there is reason for everything.
Suppose there is reason to E , and let F be anything. If E -ing or F -ing is a necessary means to E -ing, and if F -ing is a sufficient means to E -ing or F -ing, then, repeated application of those principles implies that there is reason to F Millsap b—see the Other Internet Resources. Note that similar problems arise if we accept both Ought Necessity and Ought Sufficiency.
Third, a means to an end might have a very low probability of helping to bring that end about. Suppose, to take an example from Jackson and Pargetter , Professor Procrastinate has been asked to review a book, which he both ought, and has reason, to do.
A necessary means to reviewing it is accepting the commission to review it. However, even if he accepts the commission, he is very unlikely to review it. Professor Dispatch, in a parallel universe, is in the same situation, except that he is very likely to review it if he accepts.
Perhaps Procrastinate, like Dispatch, has some reason to review it. But Procrastinate may not have as much reason as Dispatch to accept; not all of the reason for the end may be transmitted to this necessary means. And it may not be the case that Procrastinate ought to accept.
This is an argument against Strong Reasons Necessity and Ought Necessity, since even if one takes a necessary means, there may still be a low probability of helping to bring that end about. However, it is not an argument against the Sufficiency principles, assuming that sufficient means, if taken, are sure to help to bring the end about.
Nevertheless—this is the fourth and final problem—sufficient means may be superfluous to an end, where this means something like that, even if those means were omitted, the end would still be achieved. A doctor is sure to give Drug 1. Does the doctor then also have any reason to give Drug 2? At first, one might be tempted to say that the doctor does indeed have reason to give Drug 2, but that this reason is outweighed by the cost of giving Drug 2.
But observe that no matter how low we make that cost, it still outweighs any reason to give it. This suggests that there is no reason at all to give it.
Note that necessary means cannot be superfluous, since if necessary means were left out, the end would not be achieved. Now we consider instrumental rationality understood as a matter of rational coherence. It is often said that someone is being locally instrumentally incoherent insofar as he intends an end, believes, roughly, that something is a means to it, but refuses to intend that means.
More precisely, it seems that this is so only when the relevant belief is about necessary means. Suppose that I intend to go to Alaska, but believe that flying there is a sufficient, but not necessary, means to going to Alaska. Am I being instrumentally incoherent in refusing to intend to fly there? Not obviously: perhaps I believe that going by sea is cheaper, and I intend that.
Not simply intentions, but also desires, should be considered, and not simply beliefs about necessary means, but also beliefs about non-necessary means should be considered. More precisely still, the relevant belief must be that intending the means is itself necessary. Suppose your dentist intends to remove your tooth, and believes that a necessary means to removing your tooth is causing you pain.
Is she being instrumentally incoherent in refusing to intend to cause you pain? Not necessarily: she might believe that she will remove your tooth even if she does not intend to cause you pain. But she will, presumably, believe that she will remove your tooth only if she intends to use her instruments. Moreover, the relevant belief must be that intending the means now is necessary.
Suppose a beginning student intends to earn a doctoral degree and believes that, when the dissertation is completed, intending to submit the final paperwork is necessary for earning the degree. It is not clear that she is being instrumentally incoherent in refusing to intend, now, to submit that paperwork. She may trust that, when the time comes, she will intend it Setiya This suggests, as Raz notes, that opportunities for instrumental incoherence may actually be very rare.
But it is unclear exactly what requirement one violates. There are, of course, other answers that could be given. One answer is that when one is instrumentally incoherent one violates some independent requirement of reason. That is, either one has some specific attitude or pattern of attitudes that one ought not to have or one lacks some specific attitude or pattern of attitudes that one ought to have.
The source of the problem, according to this answer, is not that when one is instrumentally incoherent, one violates some requirement of reason to be instrumentally coherent as such.
See Kolodny b, a; Kiesewetter , esp. Certainly, this can happen in some cases, at least accidentally. Suppose our madman intends to start World War III, believes that he will start World War III only if he intends to launch a nuclear missile, but refuses to intend to launch a nuclear missile.
The Violation Claim might be explained in this case by pointing out that, whatever his other attitudes may be, he ought not to have the intention to start World War III, but does have that intention. But why should we suppose that, in general, whenever one has an instrumentally incoherent set, one either has an attitude or pattern that one ought not to have, or lacks an attitude or pattern that one ought to have?
This can happen in the following way. Second, how likely one is to succeed in it in turn depends on how the future is likely to be. I am more likely to succeed in drying the laundry if there is no rain. Third, how the future is likely to be can depend on how some person is likely to act. I am more likely to succeed in drying the laundry if the children are unlikely to be playing with the hose at the same time. Fourth, the relevant person may be the agent himself. I am more likely to succeed in drying the laundry if I am unlikely to be at the same time watering the garden.
Finally, the fact that an agent intends to X can make it more likely that the agent will X in the future. The fact that I intend to water the garden can make it more likely that I will be watering the garden. Thus, the fact that an agent intends to X can make it more likely that the agent will not succeed in an intention to Y , and so that the agent has less reason to intend to Y. What reason do I have to intend to X? What reason do I have to intend to X and not to intend to Y?
What reason do I have not to intend to X and to intend to Y? What reason do I have not to intend to X and not to intend to Y? First, what matters for rational requirements is what we believe about the relations between the intentions, whereas what matters for reason would seem to be how they are likely to affect one another, which may be independent of what we believe. Second, what matters for rational requirements is intending to X as such , whereas what matters for reason is what intending to X means for the future.
In some cases, intending to X e. In other cases, conditions other than intending to X e. Finally, rational requirements are usually taken to be wide-scope, as we will see below. That is, one never needs to have or lack any particular attitude in order to satisfy them.
If one ought, for example, to intend to X and not to intend to Y , then one can comply with this requirement of reason only by intending to X and not intending to Y. One might argue for Ought Pattern 1 in the following way. Suppose that it is not the case that one ought not to believe that one will E only if one intends to M.
Then by:. Suppose further that it is not the case that one ought not to intend to E. In other words, either one ought not to believe that one will E only if one intends to M , or one ought not to intend to E , or one ought to intend to M. It might be the case neither that one ought not to intend to E , nor that one ought to intend to E ; intending to E might be merely permitted.
Suppose I ought to take a can of beans. I can take the can of beans on the left, or I can take the equally good can on the right. It is neither the case that I ought not to intend to take the can on the left, nor that I ought to intend to take the can on the left. One might argue for Ought Pattern 2 in the following way.
Again, suppose that it is not the case that one ought not to have the belief. Then, by Epistemic Strictness, one ought to have the belief. For the time being, suppose that one does not intend to M.
In other words, so long as one does not intend to M , one has no reason to intend to E. If we also accept:. This makes it plausible that there is more reason not to intend to M and not to intend to E than not to intend to M and to intend to E. This does not mean that one ought not to intend to M and not to intend to E all things considered.
For example, it might be the case that one ought to intend to M and to intend to E. But it does mean that whatever pattern of intention one ought to have, it is not to not to intend to M and to intend to E. There is a superior alternative. One question, of course, is whether we should accept these assumptions, in particular Required Self-Knowledge.
Another problem is that even if this explains Ought Pattern 2, and so the Violation Claim, it does not explain the:. Suppose that one ought to have the means-end belief and one ought to intend to E and to intend to M. However, one avoids incoherence by dropping the means-end belief, not intending to E , and not intending to M. Intuitively, one has satisfied some requirement. This is what the Satisfaction Claim reflects.
How, then, are we to explain the Satisfaction Claim? A quick answer might be this. One might suggest, first, that one ought to be instrumentally coherent, because it is a necessary means to, or at least a necessary condition of, having the particular attitudes or pattern that one independently ought to have, or not having the particular attitudes or pattern that one independently ought not to have.
Suppose that one ought to intend to M , but does not. Just as P or Q is a necessary condition of P , so too a necessary condition of intending to M is either not to intend to E , or not to believe that one will E only if one intends now to M , or to intend to M.
Analogously, if one ought to post the letter, then, by similar reasoning, one ought either to post the letter or to burn it. So, if one burns the letter, one has done something that one ought, and so satisfied a requirement. Note that this response assumes that either Ought Pattern 1 or Ought Pattern 2 is correct. Otherwise, we have no guarantee that, in any given case, a necessary condition of having the particular attitudes that one ought to have, or not having the particular attitudes that one ought not to have, is either not to intend to E , or not to believe that one will E only if one intends now to M , or to intend to M.
So it inherits all of the challenges in defending Ought Pattern 1 or Ought Pattern 2. A third problem is that necessary conditions of intending to M are easy to come by.
Another necessary condition is either intending to M or being instrumentally incoherent! Therefore, in exactly the same way, one satisfies a requirement by remaining incoherent. But the intuitive Satisfaction Claim is precisely that in escaping incoherence one satisfies a requirement of a kind which one would not satisfy by remaining instrumentally incoherent. The Violation and Satisfaction Claims would be explained by a requirement of reason to avoid or escape instrumental incoherence as such.
Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be instrumentally coherent as such. One might instead suggest a weaker view: we have a reason to be instrumentally coherent as such. One could have a reason to X without being under any requirement to X , as when that reason to X is outweighed. But, according to the Violation Claim, whenever one is instrumentally incoherent, one violates some requirement. Of course, the weaker view—that we have a reason to be instrumentally coherent as such—could be true even though it fails to explain the Violation and Satisfaction Claims.
But that seems implausible. A natural reply, however, is that there is another way to be instrumentally coherent: namely, to abandon the intention to stay in power. See especially Broome and Wallace For earlier defenses of the wide-scope view, see Hill and Darwall However, there are some problems facing this approach, which we outline in the supplemental document Problems for Wide-Scoping.
Other problems concern whether the wide-scope formulation is adequate as a formulation of the rational requirement. There are other challenges facing the view that the Violation and Satisfaction Claims are explained by a requirement of reason to be instrumentally coherent as such.
Furthermore, it is not clear what reasons there are to be disposed to be instrumentally coherent. It might be thought that being disposed to be instrumentally coherent will make one more likely to conform to reason over the long run. A reason to be instrumentally coherent as such would have to apply at once to beliefs and intentions. But one might think that this cannot be the case: that reasons for belief and reasons for intention are fundamentally different in kind.
Some philosophers have attempted to meet this challenge. And Michael Bratman c has recently suggested that we have a reason to be instrumentally coherent as such because doing so is a necessary, constitutive component of self-governance, and we have an intrinsic reason to govern ourselves. In his view, just as we have a reason not to torture, and a reason to care for our children, we have a reason to govern ourselves. A third approach to instrumental incoherence holds that one need not violate any requirement of reason in being instrumentally incoherent.
Suppose one is instrumentally incoherent. Plausibly, one is in a position to know this, that one is instrumentally incoherent. Plausibly, one is also in a position to know Ought Pattern 2: the general fact that, when one is instrumentally incoherent, there is some specific change that one ought to make.
So, one is in a position to know that there is some specific change that one ought to make. So, plausibly, one ought to give some thought to what this specific change is. In other words,. Suppose one arrives at some such belief. The only difference is that it requires us not to be instrumentally coherent, but instead to be kratically coherent: i.
Of course, the instrumentally incoherent agent could be mistaken in these thoughts; perhaps he thinks reason requires him to intend the means when reason actually requires that he abandon the end instead. It is this possibility for false belief that restricts us to saying that the normativity of rational requirements is merely apparent. However, one might challenge whether the Satisfaction Claim is adequately explained by an appeal to Self-Monitoring and Krasia.
Suppose an instrumentally incoherent agent knows that she ought to give up her intention to kill her boss, but instead she comes to intend to poison the office coffee, which she believes to be a necessary means to killing her boss. She clearly violates a requirement of reason and she clearly violates Krasia, but it still seems that she satisfies some requirement in coming to intend the means to her immoral end. In holding this view, one could also say that there is value in being a properly functioning agent, and that this value is explained by the ways in which functioning properly as a agent tends to bring one into conformity with what reason requires.
Similar things could be said about the value of having well-functioning perceptual capacities.
0コメント